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Very roughly, imagination is the attitude with which we think about possibilities, 
reason counterfactually, construct pretense scenarios, and engage with stories and 
other representational artworks. As a part of our mental repertoire, it interacts with 
beliefs, desires, emotions, and other attitudes and processes to allow us to engage in a 
rich array of activities. (We will say more about imagination in section 1.) 
Very roughly, imaginative resistance is the phenomenon in which we, who 
are otherwise competent imaginers, experience a constraint in taking part in an 
imaginative activity. Philosophers have focused primarily on when people 
experience imaginative resistance in response to stories. For example, if a story 
simply states that “in killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a 
girl” without any additional context, then many readers are likely to experience a 
constraint in imaginatively engaging with this story. (We will say more about 
imaginative resistance in section 2.) 
So, where is imagination in imaginative resistance? 
In this handbook chapter, we seek to answer this question by connecting two 
ongoing lines of inquiry in different subfields of philosophy. In philosophy of mind, 
philosophers have been trying to understand imagination’s place in cognitive 
architecture. In aesthetics, philosophers have been trying to understand the 
phenomenon of imaginative resistance, especially in connection with fictional 
narratives. By connecting these two lines of inquiry, we hope to achieve mutual 
illumination of an attitude and a phenomenon that have vexed philosophers. 
Our strategy is to reorient the imaginative resistance literature from the 
perspective of cognitive architecture.1 Existing taxonomies of positions in the 
imaginative resistance literature (for example, Liao and Gendler forthcoming) have 
focused on disagreements over the source and scope of the phenomenon—mainly, 
with respect to the question of when imaginative resistance arises. In contrast, our 
proposed taxonomy focuses on the psychological components necessary for 
explaining imaginative resistance. 
                                                
* The authors are equal contributors; they are listed reverse-alphabetically. We thank Adriana Clavel Vazquez, Anna 
Ichino, Amy Kind, Shannon Spaulding, and Nils-Hennes Stear for their careful, incisive comments on earlier 
versions of this chapter. 
† PENULTIMATE VERSION. For citation and reference, please see the definitive and final version in Amy Kind (ed.), 
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. 
1 We are inspired by the approach that Jonathan Weinberg and Aaron Meskin (2006) take to puzzles that involve 
imagination: “it should hardly be surprising that many puzzles of the imagination might begin to dissolve with the 
appropriate application of cognitive science. The imagination, after all, is a faculty that creatures like us contingently 
possess and deploy in distinctive ways” (177). Currie and Ichino (2013) also pursue this strategy in their brief 
discussion of imaginative resistance. 
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We start by characterizing the attitude and the phenomenon under 
discussion. In section 1, we explain the cognitive architectural framework that guides 
this handbook chapter, and clarify the sense of imagination that is relevant to our 
discussion. In section 2, we give an overview of imaginative resistance. We then offer 
a new taxonomy of accounts of imaginative resistance based on their cognitive 
architectural commitments. In section 3, we examine cognitive imagination (or 
belief-like imagination) accounts. In section 4, we examine conative imagination (or 
desire-like imagination) accounts. In section 5, we examine accounts of imaginative 
resistance that do not fundamentally involve any imaginative attitudes. We conclude, 
in section 6, by gesturing toward directions for further research. 
 
1. Imagination 
 
1.1. Imagination as a Propositional Attitude 
 
Imagination’s nature is surprisingly mysterious. Surprising because it is so widely 
discussed and invoked in theories—in philosophy of mind, in epistemology, in 
aesthetics, and in ethics (Gendler 2011). Mysterious because even the experts have a 
hard time finding a unifying concept from the various uses. For example, in Mimesis 
as Make-Believe, the text that has arguably become the reference point for 
contemporary philosophical discussions of imagination, Kendall Walton (1990: 19) 
writes, 
 
What is it to imagine? We have examined a number of dimensions along which 
imaginings can vary; shouldn't we now spell out what they have in common?—Yes, 
if we can. But I can't. 
 
In this dispiriting spirit, numerous other philosophers—including Gendler (2011), 
Kind (2013), and Van Leeuwen (2013)—have commented on the heterogeneity of 
imagination. Hence, instead of tackling the incredibly difficult, if not impossible, 
project of delineating a central concept of imagination, we will simply stipulate the 
sense of imagination that will be relevant to our discussion. 
We will talk about imagination in its attitudinal sense—as a component of 
one’s cognitive architecture. As an attitude, imagination is located at the same 
explanatory level as other commonly recognized folk psychological attitudes such as 
belief and desire. Specifically, we will talk about imagination as a propositional 
attitude—it, like belief and desire, takes propositions as its content. Of course, there 
are many other senses of imagination (see Gendler 2011 and Van Leeuwen 2013 for 
a sample), but we will set them aside in this handbook chapter. Even with this 
narrow focus, there remain significant and substantial debates about the nature of 
imagination; these are debates about imagination’s place in cognitive architecture. 
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1.2. Cognitive Architecture 
 
A cognitive architecture is a theory about the mind at the functional—as opposed to, 
say, neurological or biological—level that aims to explain relevant psychological 
phenomena. By (literally) drawing out the functional connections between various 
components of the mind—a practice that is sometimes (derisively) called 
‘boxology’—a cognitive architecture highlights psychological laws at the functional 
level.2 
On a familiar analogy, attitudes—such as belief, desire, and imagination—
are containers of content. Each attitude is associated with a set of characteristic 
functions, or inputs and outputs. Mental states—such as specific beliefs, desires, and 
imaginings—are combinations of a container and a content, which is typically a 
proposition. Note that the container metaphor is misleading in one respect: not 
every mental state can be neatly slotted into a container. Instead, a mental state only 
needs to exhibit enough of the characteristic functions of an attitude to count, and 
ambiguous cases are common. 
 
1.3. Cognitive Architectural Debates about the Imagination 
 
In contemporary discussion, there are two prominent debates about imagination as a 
component of cognitive architecture (Liao and Doggett 2014). The first debate 
concerns the existence of an imaginative attitude that is “belief-like”, which we will 
call cognitive imagination. The second debate concerns the existence of an 
imaginative attitude that is “desire-like”, which we will call conative imagination. 
For an example of each, consider what happens when one pretends to be Romeo in 
the final act of Romeo and Juliet: one cognitively imagines that Juliet is dead, and 
consequently one also conatively imagines that Romeo is dead too.  
There are a number of features that can make these respective imaginative 
attitudes belief-like or desire like, such as functional roles, inferential patterns, and 
directions-of-fit. For example, some defenders of both cognitive and conative 
imagination say that pairs of cognitive and conative imaginings can generate actions 
and emotions in the same way that pairs of beliefs and desires can; and that’s the 
sense in which these imaginative attitudes are, respectively, belief-like and desire-like 
(Doggett and Egan 2007, 2012). 
The dominant position in this literature accepts cognitive imagination but 
rejects conative imagination (for example, Funkhouser and Spaulding 2009; Nichols 
and Stich 2003; Kind 2011; Weinberg and Meskin 2006a, 2006b). A notable minority 
                                                
2 The name ‘boxology’ comes from diagrammatic representations of cognitive architectures, in which attitudes are 
typically represented by boxes and their functions are typically represented by arrows from one box to another. The 
deployment of cognitive architecture in psychological explanations involves some assumptions that are controversial 
in the broader context of philosophy of mind. Most glaringly, this discussion assumes that it makes sense to theorize 
about the mind—at least with respect to propositional attitudes—at the functional level. That is, this discussion 
assumes that attitudes can be, at least partially, characterized by their functional roles—their dispositions to causally 
interact with other components of the mind in particular ways. However, since all discussions of the psychology of 
imaginative resistance occur at the functional—as opposed to, say, neurological or biological—level, these 
assumptions can be safely adopted in the present context. 
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accepts both cognitive and conative imagination (for example, Doggett and Egan 
2007, 2012; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002). Another notable minority rejects both 
cognitive and conative imagination as distinctive, sui generis attitudes (for example, 
Langland-Hassan 2012, 2014; Leslie 1987, 1994; and plausibly also Gendler 2008a, 
2008b). As far as we know, despite the logical possibility, no one accepts conative 
imagination but rejects cognitive imagination. Finally, of course, there exist a variety 
of positions that do not fall neatly into this taxonomy (for example, Schellenberg 
2013; Van Leeuwen 2011). 
The broader debate between these positions on imaginative attitudes 
primarily turns on the respective cognitive architectures’ ability to explain relevant 
psychological phenomena. In the context of this broader debate, imaginative 
resistance is one psychological phenomenon that can be used to test different 
cognitive architectures’ explanatory power and empirical adequacy. For example, all 
else being equal, if it turns out that the best explanation of imaginative resistance 
invokes cognitive imagination but not conative imagination, then imaginative 
resistance functions as a data point that pushes us, if only weakly, toward the 
currently dominant position.  
With this broader debate in mind, we will examine different accounts of 
imaginative resistance and draw out their cognitive architectural commitments in 
sections 3-5. Specifically, we will focus on where in the mind different accounts 
locate the experienced constraint that characterizes imaginative resistance. Before we 
can do so, we will give an overview of the puzzling psychological phenomenon in 
question.  
 
2. Imaginative Resistance 
 
2.1. Phenomenon and Puzzles 
 
Arguably, contemporary philosophical discussions of imaginative resistance began 
with Walton (1994: 31; but see also Walton 1990; Moran 1994; Gendler 2000), who 
noted a curious asymmetry while echoing a passage from David Hume (1757): 
 
If we find the perspective presented in a story [morally] offensive enough, we may 
object even to imagining taking it up. We might refuse to empathize with a 
character who accepts it, to put ourselves imaginatively in her shoes. We usually 
don't flinch at imagining accepting as true nonmoral propositions that we firmly 
believe to be false: the proposition that there is a ring that makes its wearer invisible, 
or that a village in Scotland appears and disappears every hundred years. 
 
On a first pass, the asymmetry that Walton points to is that we do not resist 
imagining non-moral propositions that we do not believe in, but we do resist 
imagining moral propositions we do not believe in. 
What is an example of a moral proposition that we resist imagining? Walton 
(1994) offers the following: 
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Giselda. In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl. 
 
Suppose the reader reads this sentence as part of a story’s text (hereafter, when the 
reader encounters “Giselda”). The reader is likely to have several related reactions 
that give rise to distinctive philosophical puzzles (Liao and Gendler forthcoming; see 
also Weatherson 2004 and Walton 2006): 
 
1. Imaginative Puzzle. Why does the reader have difficulty imagining that Giselda 
really did the morally right thing?  
2. Fictionality Puzzle. Why does the reader have difficulty accepting that it is fictional, 
or true in the story world, that Giselda really did the right thing?  
3. Phenomenological Puzzle. Why does the reader experience a sense of jarring 
confusion in response to the sentence? 
4. Aesthetic Value Puzzle. Why does the reader think or judge that the story would be 
aesthetically superior if this sentence were omitted? 
 
Given the complexity of imaginative resistance, it is no wonder that Walton (2006) 
wryly remarks ‘the puzzle of imaginative resistance’ is a composed of a series of 
misnomers, except the word ‘of’; it is not just one puzzle, but several puzzles, and not 
all of them have to do with imagination or with resistance.3 We will focus on the 
puzzles that have to do with psychological aspects of imaginative resistance, namely 
the imaginative and phenomenological puzzles.4 Both are concerned with how 
readers psychologically respond to sentences like the one above, which evoke 
imaginative resistance. 
Imaginative resistance should be distinguished from the related 
phenomenon of hermeneutic recalibration, which is a common literary technique of 
temporarily puzzling the reader so as to cause her to reconsider and reinterpret the 
imaginative prompt (Liao 2013). In cases of hermeneutic recalibration, one 
eventually comes to a relatively stable understanding of the imaginative prompt. For 
example, one can feel like one can finally make sense of an initially puzzling sentence. 
However, in cases of imaginative resistance, even after multiple attempts to 
reconsider and reinterpret the imaginative prompt, the characteristic reactions—the 
difficulties with imagining and accepting the puzzling proposition, the experience of 
jarring confusion, and the thought that the work would be aesthetically better off 
without the puzzling proposition—persist. 
 Even if we restrict our discussion to cases involving persistent perplexity, 
there remain disagreements about the scope of the phenomenon. For example, while 
                                                
3 In fact, nothing hangs on the name “imaginative puzzle”. We are merely using it as a placeholder for the puzzle in 
this vicinity that is concerned with the reader’s psychological attitudes toward puzzling stories like Giselda. As we 
will see in section 5, it could turn out that, on the best overall explanation of imaginative resistance, imagination 
plays no fundamental role in explaining the so-called imaginative puzzle. 
4 On an alternative formulation, the imaginative puzzle too has a normative dimension and is perhaps better 
characterized as the imaginability puzzle (Liao 2011; Liao and Gendler forthcoming; Stear manuscript; Todd 2009). 
On this alternative formulation, the emphasis is on why the reader ought not imagine that Giselda really did the 
morally right thing while imaginatively engaging with the story, regardless of the reader’s actual difficulty with 
imagining so. On this alternative formulation, there is a close relationship between the imaginative puzzle and the 
fictionality puzzle because what is fictional is equivalent to what is to be imagined (see Walton 1990; but see also the 
caveats added by Walton 2013).  
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Tamar Szabó Gendler (2000, 2006) argues for the centrality of moral deviance to 
resistance phenomena, others think that imaginative resistance can also arise with 
cases of aesthetic deviance, epistemic deviance, etc. (for example, Walton 1994, 2006; 
Weatherson 2004; Yablo 2002). Hence, our first pass at the asymmetry that defines 
imaginative resistance will have to be refined accordingly to reflect these scope 
disagreements. Moreover, these disagreements about the exact explanandum 
constitute one source for the conflicting explanans of imaginative resistance. Indeed, 
as we will see next, these disagreements about scope can even make other 
philosophers doubt the existence of the whole phenomenon.  
 
2.2. Skepticism about Imaginative Resistance 
 
On our treatment, the phenomenon of imaginative resistance functions as a data 
point in resolving cognitive architectural debates about imagination. However, it is 
only fair to note that whether it really counts a data point is in contention. There 
exists a group of philosophers—call them imaginative resistance doubters—who have 
expressed skepticism about the very existence of a philosophical problem in the 
vicinity. 
Imaginative resistance doubters contend that there is no such a thing as 
imaginative resistance per se. Rather, they maintain, the appearance of a 
philosophical problem arises from the bizarre so-called stories that philosophers 
have concocted. Nothing like the imaginative or phenomenological puzzles arises 
with narratives we ordinarily encounter in non-philosophical contexts. Consider the 
following statement, from Mary Mothersill (2003: 90): 
 
[…] a fictional world is not created by a single proposition and hence that 
whether that proposition is or is not imaginable is otiose. […] to grasp the 
moral content of a novel, you have to read the whole novel. 
 
Imaginative resistance, the doubters contend, can at most be found in philosophers’ 
poor attempts at literature. It is only because they have focused on single 
propositions divorced from context – or one-page stories constructed for the sake of 
making a philosophical point – that philosophers think there is a problem to be 
explained (Todd 2009). The doubters contend that propositions that are alleged to 
evoke imaginative resistance typically cease to do so once appropriate context is 
given (modulo some relativity regarding general imaginative capacity). 
There is a core insight that can be gleaned from the doubters’ arguments: 
imaginative resistance is not a phenomenon about particular propositions; instead it 
is a phenomenon about the interactions between particular propositions and 
particular contexts. While affirming the existence of the phenomenon, recent 
accounts of imaginative resistance have incorporated the core insight of the doubters 
to refine the puzzles and solutions associated with the phenomenon (see, for 
example, Brock 2012 and Liao, Strohminger, and Sripada 2014).  
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3. Cognitive Imagination Accounts 
  
Cognitive imagination accounts typically invoke cognitive imagination in 
conjunction with other relatively uncontroversial attitudes or processes (for example, 
belief and desire) in their explanations of imaginative resistance. Given that these 
explanations appeal to cognitive imagination and other attitudes or processes, these 
accounts can vary with respect to the degree to which cognitive imagination is 
central to explaining the phenomenon. However, despite such differences, they 
nevertheless share the core feature of placing the constraint that one experiences 
during imaginative resistance on cognitive imagination.  
Although they are not always explicit, these accounts typically take conative 
imagination to be unnecessary for explaining imaginative resistance. Hence, insofar 
as these accounts are successful, they push us toward the position in the cognitive 
architectural debate that accepts cognitive imagination and rejects conative 
imagination. 
We discuss four types of cognitive imagination accounts below. The 
distinction between these accounts does not necessarily imply strict incompatibility 
between them. For example, it might turn out that different accounts provide 
plausible descriptions of different aspects of the phenomenon of imaginative 
resistance. Or, it might turn out that an account is plausible at one level of 
description (for example, the personal level), while another is plausible at another 
level of description (for example, the subpersonal level). 
 
3.1. Single Code for Cognitive Imagination and Belief  
 
One type of cognitive imagination account appeals to the functional and 
representational similarities between cognitive imagination and belief to explain 
imaginative resistance. 
According to a now widely-accepted hypothesis, cognitive imagination and 
believe operate on a single code: they share three key characteristics (Nichols 2004, 
2006). First, cognitive imagination has belief-like propositional content. The same 
proposition, such as <Mitt Romney is the President of the United States>, can be 
taken on by both cognitive imagination and belief. Second, cognitive imagination 
displays belief-like inferential regularities (Leslie 1987). When one believes the 
proposition <if a cup filled with water is upturned, it is now empty> and the 
proposition <a cup filled with water is upturned>, then one is strongly disposed to 
believe the proposition <the cup is now empty>. Similarly, when one cognitively 
imagines the proposition <if a cup filled with water is upturned, it is now empty> 
and the proposition <a cup filled with water is upturned>, then one is strongly 
disposed to cognitively imagine the proposition <the cup is now empty>. Third, and 
most importantly, cognitive imagination has belief-like functional connections to 
moral and affect systems—as we will quickly see below. 
Shaun Nichols (2004, 2006) argues, on the basis of this picture, that 
imaginative resistance is best explained by the hypothesis that cognitive imaginings 
are processed by a moral system in the same way that analogous beliefs are processed. 
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When one believes that a mother kills her baby merely because the baby is a girl, 
one’s moral system typically produces responses of condemnation. Similarly, when 
one cognitively imagines—when encountering “Giselda”—that a mother kills her 
baby merely because the baby is a girl, one’s moral system typically produces 
responses of condemnation too. Given these responses of condemnation, one 
encounters difficulties with cognitively imagining—when encountering “Giselda”—
that the mother did the morally right thing.  
Jonathan Weinberg and Aaron Meskin (2006; see also Meskin and Weinberg 
2011) propose a similar idea. On their explanation, imaginative resistance arises 
from a conflict between different cognitive systems. When one encounters “Giselda”, 
there exists a conflict between one’s representation input system—cognitive 
imagination—that takes in the explicitly stipulated moral deviance (namely, Giselda 
did the morally right thing) as its content, and one’s moral system that makes an 
independent judgment (namely, Giselda did not do the morally right thing) on the 
basis of the fictional scenario’s relevant non-moral features. The account by 
Weinberg and Meskin is peculiar in that it allows for the cases where there is moral 
deviance but imaginative resistance does not arise (see also Weinberg 2008). On 
their explanation, these cases are possible because under certain circumstances either 
the relevant representation input system or the relevant processes within the moral 
system can be locally suspended so that no psychological conflict arises. (We will say 
more about these cases in section 3.3.) 
 
3.2. Cognitive Imagination + Belief about the World  
 
Another type of cognitive imagination accounts appeals to the interactions between 
cognitive imagination and belief to explain imaginative resistance. To start, we will 
focus on accounts that focus on interactions between cognitive imaginings and 
beliefs about the real world (as opposed to beliefs about the imaginative prompt 
itself). 
In particular, many of these accounts focus on the supervenience 
relationships that hold in the real world. On their diagnoses, imaginative resistance 
is the manifestation of the inability to cognitively imagine stories that involve higher-
lower inconsistencies (Walton 1994, Weatherson 2004, Miyazono manuscript, Stear 
manuscript). These inconsistencies can arise with propositions that are true, when 
they are true, in virtue of the truth of other propositions. For example, some 
philosophers think that a proposition about an action’s moral status is true, when it 
is true, in virtue of the truth of other propositions about non-moral features of that 
action, such as propositions about the harms that the action causes. In this example, 
the moral propositions are higher-level and the non-moral propositions are lower-
level. What is peculiar about prompts that evoke imaginative resistance, such as 
“Giselda”, is that they involve inconsistencies between the higher- and lower-level 
propositions that one is supposed to cognitively imagine.  
Higher-lower inconsistencies arise because we have beliefs about how 
higher-level propositions should relate to lower-level propositions, which we import 
into our imaginative engagements. For example, we might think that, insofar as 
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female infanticide can be the morally right thing to do in some cases, it is only 
because of some explicable reason like not committing the female infanticide would 
cause more deaths. When one encounters “Giselda” without additional context, no 
such explicable reason is present, and so given our belief in the relationship between 
moral and non-moral propositions, we cannot cognitively imagine the higher-level 
moral proposition (namely, Giselda did the morally right thing) given what we have 
cognitively imagined at the lower level (namely, Giselda killed the baby just because 
the baby is a girl). As Brian Weatherson (2004: 21) notes, “we can imagine the 
higher-level claim only some way or another, just as we imagine a chair only as some 
chair or other”. We cannot cognitively imagine the moral proposition, because the 
non-moral propositions we cognitively imagined do not constitute one of the ways 
of realizing the moral rightness of female infanticide. 
Of course, the relevant beliefs about the world that affect our cognitive 
imaginings need not be beliefs about supervenience relationships. For example, Cain 
Todd (2009) speculates that deontologists and utilitarians might respond differently 
to the same stories that are alleged to evoke imaginative resistance. More generally, 
one’s background belief about (meta)ethical issues might shape one’s cognitive 
imaginings differently. Difference in background beliefs about (meta)ethical issues 
might help to explain some individual differences in imaginative resistance that 
some philosophers have observed.  
 
3.3. Cognitive Imagination + Belief about the Imaginative Prompt  
 
Continuing our focus on accounts that use interactions between cognitive 
imagination and belief to explain imaginative resistance, we now turn to accounts 
that focus on interactions between cognitive imaginings and beliefs about the 
imaginative prompt (as opposed to beliefs about the real world). On these accounts, 
during imaginative engagements with particular prompts, our cognitive imaginings 
are shaped by beliefs that we have about the prompts. 
The most notable variant of this type of accounts appeals to beliefs about 
genre conventions that govern stories (Gendler 2000, Weinberg 2008, Nanay 2010, 
Liao 2011, Willard manuscript). On their diagnoses, the relevant constraints on 
cognitive imagination do not come from beliefs about the real world, but beliefs 
about fictional worlds. For example, while few people believe that divine command 
theory is true of the real world, many more believe that divine command theory is 
true of fictional worlds of creation myths and other religious stories. As such, while 
few people believe that the truth of moral propositions supervene on the truth of 
non-moral propositions about God or gods’ pronouncements, many more believe 
that the fictional truth of moral propositions supervene on the fictional truth of non-
moral propositions about God or gods’ pronouncements, when it comes to creation 
myths and other religious stories. The belief about divine command theory being 
true in creation myths and other religious stories is an example of a belief about 
genre conventions. These accounts can explain why the same proposition can be 
puzzling in one story but not another, when two stories belong to different genres 
and so are governed by different conventions. 
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It is possible to incorporate the role of beliefs about the imaginative prompt 
into accounts of imaginative resistance discussed earlier. For example, Weinberg 
(2008) modifies the earlier account in Weinberg and Meskin (2006) to make explicit 
the role of beliefs about genre conventions. Recall that on Weinberg and Meskin’s 
original account, imaginative resistance arises from a conflict between cognitive 
systems, but conflicts can be avoided when one cognitive system can be “locally 
suspended”. According to Weinberg (2008), beliefs about genre conventions 
constitute one way to locally suspend the moral system—or, more precisely, to 
locally suspend the typical connection between cognitive imagination and the moral 
system—such that no conflict arises.  
This type of imaginative resistance accounts has recently received some 
support regarding its empirical adequacy. Shen-yi Liao, Nina Strohminger, and 
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2014) reports two empirical studies they conducted to 
show that beliefs of genre conventions can influence one’s imaginative responses to 
fictions. Study 1 shows that there is a correlation between one’s familiarity with a 
genre, which affects the likelihood that one correctly believes the relevant genre 
conventions, and one’s experienced difficulty in cognitively imagining a morally 
deviant proposition. Study 2 finds that manipulating governing genre conventions 
makes the same morally deviant proposition relatively difficult to cognitively 
imagine in one story but not in another.  
 
3.4. Cognitive Imagination + Desire 
 
The final type of cognitive imagination accounts appeals to the interactions between 
cognitive imagination and desire to explain imaginative resistance. According to 
these accounts, the difficulty with cognitively imagining puzzling propositions is not 
a kind of inability, but a kind of unwillingness. 
Gendler (2000, 2006) provides the paradigmatic example of this type of 
accounts. Gendler (2000) notes that resistance-evoking stories are what she calls 
“non-distoring fictions”. Something that is true in the real world is likely to be true 
in these fictional worlds, and more importantly, something that is true in these 
fictional worlds is likely to be in true in the real world. Hence, if we judge something 
as true in these stories, there is a prima facie demand that we judge it as true in the 
real world as well. For example, if we are to cognitively imagine that Giselda’s female 
infanticide is morally right, then there is pressure on us to believe that analogous 
cases of female infanticide in the real world are morally right as well. However, as 
Gendler notes, we have strong desire not to believe that analogous cases of female 
infanticide are morally right in reality, and so this in turn pressures us not to 
cognitively imagine that Giselda’s female infanticide is morally right. As Gendler 
(2000: 77) puts the point: “my hypothesis is that cases that evoke genuine 
imaginative resistance will be cases where the reader feels that she is being asked to 
export a way of looking at the actual world which she does not wish to add to her 
conceptual repertoire.”  
Gendler (2006) provides a refinement of the earlier account on which desire 
plays a less central role in explaining imaginative resistance. Moran (1994) and 
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Currie (2011) can also be seen as proponents of accounts that give desire a 
significant role in explaining imaginative resistance, sometimes via emotions that are 
generated by the relevant desires. 
 
4. Conative Imagination Accounts 
  
Conative imagination accounts invoke both cognitive and conative imagination in 
their explanations of imaginative resistance. As the name indicates, a core feature 
that these accounts share is that they place the constraint that one experiences 
during imaginative resistance on conative imagination. Insofar as these accounts are 
successful, they push us toward the position in the cognitive architectural debate that 
accepts both cognitive and conative imagination.  
 
4.1 Desire-like Imagination 
 
There seems to be an asymmetry between supposing and imagining a morally deviant 
proposition. We seem to have no trouble supposing that female infanticide is 
morally right without any further explanation for the purpose of, say, philosophical 
arguments. However, as our responses to “Giselda” shows, we do have trouble 
imagining that female infanticide is morally right, absent some explanation. 
Gregory Currie (2004) gives an interpretation of this asymmetry at the 
cognitive architectural level. What we ordinarily call “imagination” is the use of both 
cognitive and conative imagination. In contrast, what we ordinarily call “supposition” 
is the use of cognitive imagination without the accompaniment of conative 
imagination. On this interpretation, the fact that we can easily suppose the moral 
rightness of female infanticide but cannot easily imagine so is evidence that cognitive 
imagination does not play a central role in explaining imaginative resistance. In fact, 
the explanatory work is done by a specific version of conative imagination that he 
calls “desire-like imagination”. 
Whereas to desire something is to want it to be the case in the real world, to 
desire-like imagine something is to want it to be the case in some imagined or 
fictional world. However, Currie says that there is an important difference between 
the dissociability between cognitive imagining and belief and the dissociability 
between desire-like imagining and desire. While we can easily cognitively imagine 
something we do not believe, we cannot easily desire-like imagine something we do 
not desire. Hence, for the majority of people who do not in fact desire that female 
infanticide for no obvious reason is morally right, it is difficult to desire-like imagine 
that female infanticide for no obvious reason is morally right. And this difficulty to 
desire-like imagine so is what explains the difficulty with imagination that “Giselda” 
brings out. 
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4.2. Value-like Imagination 
 
Dustin Stokes (2006) revises Currie’s account and argues that the relevant conative 
imaginative attitude is not Currie’s desire-like imagination but what he calls “value-
like imagination”. Stokes relies on David Lewis’s (1989) picture of valuing, on which 
to value something is to have a second-order desire of that thing: to value x is to 
desire that one desires x. On Stokes’s account, imaginative resistance is best 
explained by value-like imagination, an attitude to want oneself to want something 
to be the case in some imagined or fictional world. 
Stokes argues that desire-like imagination is insufficient to explain 
imaginative resistance. For example, it is not clear how Currie’s view explains why 
we experience imaginative resistance with a story that says that a really dumb 
Knock-Knock joke is hilariously funny (Walton 1994). We have no actual desire 
about the joke and its funniness. So there is no reason to think that our desire-like 
imagination is constrained by any actual desire in this case. However, there is reason 
to think that it would be a part of our value system that the dumb joke is not 
hilariously funny: we do not want it to be true of ourselves that we want the dumb 
joke to be funny. Hence, given the relatively low dissociability between value-like 
imagining and value, we cannot easily value-imagine that a really dumb Knock-
Knock joke is hilariously funny.  
 
5. No Imagination Accounts 
 
No imagination accounts bypass imaginative attitudes altogether in their 
explanations of imaginative resistance. In other words, on these accounts neither 
cognitive nor conative imagination—as they are standardly characterized—factor in 
understanding the psychology of imaginative resistance at the fundamental level. 
They place the constraint that one experiences during imaginative resistance on 
neither cognitive nor conative imagination, but elsewhere in cognitive architecture. 
Hence, insofar as these accounts are successful, they push us toward the position in 
the cognitive architectural debate that rejects both cognitive and conative 
imagination.  
 
5.1. Alief 
 
In an evolution of her earlier views, Gendler (2008a, 2008b) argues that imaginative 
contagion, cases where (merely) imaginative engagement with fictions can reshape 
our real-world moral views, may ultimately be traced to a novel psychological state 
that she calls “alief”. Roughly, aliefs are innate or habitual propensities to respond to 
apparent stimuli in automatic and associative ways. According to Gendler (2008b), 
aliefs are antecedent to other cognitive attitudes, including belief and cognitive 
imagination: “Indeed, one might even argue that it is out of these more primitive 
association patterns [that constitute aliefs] … that the less fundamental differentiated 
attitudes like belief, desire, and imagination are constructed” (643; our emphases). 
Alief is unlike imagination in some ways; for example, aliefs tend to be opaque to the 
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subject: they are not generally available for introspective access. However, alief is also 
like imagination in other ways; for example, they are both to a degree source-
insensitive: they need not track how the subject consciously conceives of the world. 
Although Gendler never explicitly spells out, in print, the implication of alief 
for explaining imaginative resistance, the relative source-insensitivity of aliefs 
suggests a relatively straightforward proposal. Since aliefs are source-insensitive, 
even contents we consciously recognize as purely imaginary can produce powerful 
emotional and cognitive responses of the sort that underpin imaginative contagion. 
Not all contents do so, of course. However, plausibly our deeply held moral 
commitments are just the sort of content that would be encoded in aliefs, such that 
being asked to imagine that Giselda’s female infanticide is morally right would 
trigger psychological responses that are characteristic of imaginative resistance. 
Given the importance Gendler now places on aliefs, it is plausible that she thinks 
that, at least for some questions concerning imaginative resistance, a psychological 
framework at the level of aliefs can provide better explanations than a psychological 
framework at the level of cognitive imaginings.  
If Gendler is right that alief is more primitive and fundamental than 
cognitive imagination, then the most fundamental cognitive architecture no longer 
contains cognitive imagination or belief as sui generis attitudes. In turn, a 
psychological explanation of imaginative resistance at this fundamental cognitive 
architectural level does not locate the constraint that one experiences during 
imaginative resistance in cognitive imagination (or conative imagination, for that 
matter); instead, it locates that constraint in alief. Hence, we count this a no 
imagination account because it plausibly bypasses all imaginative attitudes in 
explaining imaginative resistance. 
Considering how Gendler’s most recent account differs from her earlier 
ones is also useful for bringing out the theoretical value of our cognitive architectural 
re-orientation of the imaginative resistance literature. Although Gendler’s 
understanding of the phenomenon of imaginative resistance itself has only subtly 
evolved throughout the years, the alief-based account is a substantial departure from 
the imagination-based account at the cognitive architectural level. It would be harder 
to detect this substantial change in her overall position using existing taxonomies of 
positions in the imaginative resistance debate. 
 
5.2. Emotion 
 
Ronald De Sousa (2010) argues that emotion plays a central role in generating 
imaginative resistance. On this view, imagination is unconstrained, but emotional 
responses to imaginings are constrained. Imaginative resistance is the product of 
constraints on emotional responses: “what is really going on in these cases is not so 
much an inability to imagine, but to experience a certain emotional response (or an 
absence of emotional response) to something imagined” (De Sousa 2010: 108).  
On this account, a story evokes imaginative resistance when (1) one part of 
the story generates some emotional response that does not fit with what another part 
of the story asks us to imagine, or (2) when one part of the story fails to generate 
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some emotional response that fits with what another part of the story asks us to 
imagine. For an example of (1), we can revisit what happens when one encounters 
“Giselda”. We respond to the claim that Giselda killed her baby just because the baby 
was a girl with disapprobation and disgust, which does not fit with also imagining 
that what she did is morally right. For an example of (2), we can revisit the Knock-
Knock joke story. We fail to respond to the dumb Knock-Knock joke with mirth, 
which is the emotion that fits with imagining that the joke is hilariously funny. 
Note that De Sousa’s account is distinct from other accounts that invoke 
emotion in connection with cognitive imagination and other attitudes (Moran 1994; 
Currie 2011; Van Leeuwen forthcoming). On these other accounts, it is still 
imagination, perhaps in interaction with other attitudes such as desire, that 
ultimately explains imaginative resistance; emotions are just mediators in the 
explanation. However, on De Sousa’s account, the experienced constraint that 
characterizes imaginative resistance directly comes from constraints on emotions. 
Hence, we count this as a no imagination account too. 
 
6. Directions for Future Research 
 
In this chapter, we have given an introduction to the phenomenon of imaginative 
resistance from the perspective of cognitive architecture, with special attention to 
imaginative attitudes’ role in explaining this phenomenon. By dividing up accounts 
of imaginative resistance based on their psychological commitments, we have also 
laid the groundwork for theorizing about the mind using the phenomenon of 
imaginative resistance.  
Of course, the task of theorizing the mind using the phenomenon of 
imaginative resistance may be complicated by the very nature of imaginative 
resistance. Although we have treated imaginative resistance as a unified 
phenomenon, ongoing disagreements about its scope suggests that there may be 
multiple related phenomena in the vicinity that demand different psychological 
explanations (Currie and Ichino 2013). If that were the case, then we must approach 
the task piecemeal and consider the different cognitive architectural implications of 
different psychological explanations. 
The new orientation we have developed in this handbook chapter can spur 
further progress on the elusive phenomenon of imaginative resistance and the 
equally elusive attitude(s) of imagination in other ways: 
 
- Aestheticians who work on imaginative resistance can be more explicit about their 
cognitive architectural commitments and also about cognitive architectural 
commitments of competing explanations. 
- Philosophers of mind who work on imagination can make holistic assessments of 
competing cognitive architectures by examining a wide range of psychological 
phenomena that are primarily discussed in cognate subfields. 
- Psychologists and experimental philosophers can design better studies of 
imaginative resistance by considering its potential psychological commitments, 
which can lead to new discoveries about aspects of imaginative resistance that are 
less readily accessible to introspection or intuition. 
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